Approximately 900,000 Druze live in various regions and districts across Syria. The vast majority reside in the al-Suwayda province (Jabal al-Druze) in the south of the country, while others live in the outskirts and suburbs of Damascus and in small villages around the Hermon area.
Historically, Druze settlement in Syria occurred in several waves from the 11th to the 18th century. Moreover, the Druze played a significant role in defending Syria and even in its formation and independence, but this is not the time to explore that history.
On December 8, 2024, with the fall of the Assad regime by the hands of HTS and the beginning of the establishment of a new regime in Syria led by the head of the forces, Ahmad al-Sharaa (al-Joulani), a public discourse began, led by the Israeli government and backed by the Druze leadership in Israel, regarding the fate of the Druze in Syria. This included discussions about annexation, autonomy, and more.
Israel’s Prime Minister and Defense Minister publicly stated that they would provide protection and shelter to the Druze and would not allow any group to harm them.
It is important to note that the emerging regime in Syria is extremist Islamist and jihadist in nature, with elements from al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Jabhat al-Nusra—terrorist groups that view non-Muslims as legitimate targets for death. Given this, and considering the Druze's religious and historical context, there is real concern about how the new regime will treat them.
Throughout history, the Druze have insisted on their right to bear arms for self-defense, given repeated attempts to annihilate them over the past 1,000 years. Importantly, they have never turned these arms against the state or innocent civilians, unless directly attacked. This capability for self-defense allowed the Druze to be loyal citizens while resisting efforts by extremist regimes to coerce them into serving as mercenaries.
Therefore, government attempts to disarm the Druze were met with outright refusal, and they have successfully retained their weapons for emergencies.
The public discourse (regarding the Syrian Druze) mentioned above has led to several developments that have clearly influenced events in Syria. Supporters of the Islamic regime now see the Druze as subversive citizens who reject its authority and even portray them as collaborators with the "Zionist entity" (Israel).
This, in turn, has raised great expectations among the Druze that Israel would protect them and prevent any group from harming them. They are well aware of Israel's immense capabilities, as demonstrated in the fight against Hezbollah and Iran, including intelligence, technology, and operational reach throughout Syria.
In recent days, armed militias aligned with and backed by the regime (despite claims they are uncontrollable) have begun attacking, looting, kidnapping, and murdering Druze in villages and suburbs. The attacks, as reported by mass media, are clearly religiously motivated—targeting the Druze solely for being Druze. Sadly, history is repeating itself, with an ethnic group being persecuted and murdered for religious reasons and for not belonging to the dominant group.
Two villages—Sakhna’a and Ashrafiyya—southwest of Damascus, were taken over. Jaramana, a suburb of Damascus, is under siege. Al-Suwayda is under fire from the opposite side, with talk of convoys en route, and the Hermon villages are besieged and inaccessible.
Since the beginning of these events, the Syrian Druze have looked toward Israel and the Druze in Israel, who promised to provide security in every possible forum. The Druze community in Israel mobilized and began acting to prompt the Israeli government to intervene. However, the Israeli government has not rushed to respond, which led to public protests and pressure on politicians to take action.
The principle of mutual responsibility—Hifz al-Ikhwan—a core value in the Druze community, led to mass mobilization. Organized and spontaneous efforts were initiated to influence the situation.
On Friday night, the Israeli Air Force bombed the presidential palace in Damascus and carried out several other airstrikes on targets in Syria. Humanitarian aid was delivered, and injured Druze Syrians were allowed to receive treatment in Israeli hospitals.
Nonetheless, the response of Israel to the plight of the Druze has been very disappointing and has not met the expectations of either Syrian or Israeli Druze.
Based on the above, I propose the following understandings and lessons:
- The Druze in Syria must be granted a quiet status quo; first and foremost, Israeli/regional/international efforts must halt the attacks against them.
- Cease making public statements about the Druze's fate in Syria. They will remain proud Syrian citizens and know how to navigate the situation, as they have in the past and present.
- The Druze must be granted legitimacy to possess arms for self-defense and even be reinforced in anticipation of further attacks.
- Israel should carry out covert, targeted operations as it knows how—without public declarations or celebrations.
- The Israeli Druze community must analyze this event internally and prepare for doing better in similar future events (which are likely).
- A major takeaway: there is a need to establish a cabinet/body/administration to handle erupting crises with a structured plan and effective operational management. This body should include:
- A central command table managing the event.
- A war room to coordinate efforts.
- An intelligence room to provide accurate situational awareness—not based on private initiatives.
- A public diplomacy unit to communicate with different audiences—Israeli Druze, non-Druze Israelis, regional, and international.
We will act and succeed.
Shadi Abu Fares, Business and Social Entrepreneur, Colonel (Res.) IDF